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of  open  source  biology  (BiOS,  Biological 
Innovation  for  Open  Society)11  and  in 
institutional  collaborations  to  facilitate 
access  to  crucial  enabling  technologies 
(PIPRA, Public Intellectual Property Rights 
for Agriculture)12. They support the wide-
spread adoption of the Uniform Biological 
Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) for 
exchanges among scientists, long advocated 
by the National Institutes of Health13. In 
concurrence with previous related research, 
they offer no reason to continue supporting 
a stronger academic research exemption as 
urged, for example, by Cukier14.
The survey
We mailed a questionnaire to all listed fac-
ulty in departments related to agricultural 
biology at four land grant institutions: the 
University  of  California  (UC)  Berkeley, 
UC Davis, UC Riverside and University of 
Arizona in 2005. The gross response rate 
of 25% (93 responses), though modest, is 
comparable to those reported for the recent 
studies  in  the  United  States  (27%),  the 
United Kingdom (16%) and Japan (19%) 
reported in the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) study 
by Hansen15. Eighty-five of our respondents 
were able to provide useful responses; the 
others  predominantly  reported  that  their 
work currently focused on administration or 
other nonresearch activities. A comparison 
(Supplementary Material online) of PubMed 
publications and patents of nonrespondents 
and respondents in a random sample of 80 
faculty members in these departments gives 
no grounds for suspecting nonresponse bias. 
We conducted follow-up interviews with a 
subset  of  respondents  (Supplementary 
Interviews)  to  explore  the  nature  of  the 
access problems they reported.
of scientists’ own views of the trade-off involved 
in IP protection of research tools.
Here  we  report  scientists’  assessments 
regarding the overall effects of IP protection, 
as revealed in a survey of academic agricultural 
biologists. Scientists believe that, contrary to the 
current consensus, proliferation of IP protec-
tion has a strongly negative effect on research in 
their disciplines. Our respondents’ answers on 
the details of access problems are highly consis-
tent with those reported in the recent literature, 
but they ultimately relate these problems to the 
proliferation of IP protection in academia.
Follow-up interviews, which recorded scien-
tists’ extended accounts of selected cases, pro-
vide further insights on how bench scientists 
experience the negative effects of IP protection 
(Supplementary  Interviews  online).  They 
attribute problems of delayed or blocked access 
to needed research tools to material transfer 
agreements (MTAs). Academic administrators 
mandate use of MTAs to protect the value of the 
IP rights held by their institutions or to reduce   
their exposure to lawsuits by third parties. In 
short,  the  major  impediment  to  accessing 
research tools is not patents per se, but patent-
ing as an institutional imperative in the post-
Bayh-Dole era.
Our respondents do not encounter an anti-
commons  or  a  patent  thicket.  Rather,  they 
believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put 
sand in the wheels of a lively system of intra-
disciplinary exchanges of research tools. Seeing 
no countervailing effect on the supply of these 
tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the 
progress of research.
These  findings  challenge  the  infer-
ences of social scientists that there are no 
real  problems  with  policies  encouraging 
increased patenting of research tools. They 
also help explain why agricultural biolo-
gists have become leaders in the exploration 
A 
system of intellectual property (IP) rights 
can encourage inventions by scientists and 
help promote the transformation of research 
achievements  into  marketed  products.  But 
associated restrictions on access can reduce uti-
lization of inventions by other scientists. How is 
this trade-off working out in practice?
This question has been of particular concern 
for the biological sciences, where production 
and exchange of biological ‘research tools’ are 
important  for  ongoing  scientific  progress. 
Recent studies addressing this issue in the United 
States1,2, Germany3, Australia4 and Japan5 find 
that “patent thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 
rarely affect the research of academic scientists. 
It is well known that biological scientists report 
increasing difficulties associated with access to 
research tools but only if the tools are embod-
ied in physical property controlled by others 
and not easily duplicated. Fear of infringing a 
prior patent on this material, or the high cost 
of licensing, is rarely a factor.
Reviewing this evidence, Caulfield et al. infer 
that “[t]he problems that the data do reveal may 
have less to do with patents than with com-
mercial concerns, scientific competition and 
frictions in sharing physical materials”8. The 
emerging consensus of the science and policy 
literature frames the issue as “material versus 
intellectual property”9,10 and considers the lat-
ter to be rarely a problem for scientists.
This consensus relies on indirect inference. 
The literature offers almost no direct evidence 
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The impact of IP protection
Respondents tend to be realistically skeptical 
regarding the existence of any research exemp-
tion. Over 80% do not agree with the state-
ment: “Academic researchers have an academic 
research exemption that allows them to use oth-
ers’ research tools without paying attention to 
potential infringement.”
Nevertheless, researchers’ own actions exhibit 
scant attention to the risk of infringing existing 
patents. Most (77 of 85) report that, in the past 
five years, they have never checked whether a 
tool that they might need in planned research 
is patented. (Similarly, only 5% of the biomedi-
cal scientists surveyed in Walsh, Cho & Cohen2 
report that they regularly check for patents on 
research inputs.)
If respondents are generally skeptical regard-
ing a research exemption, why do so few check 
for prior patent rights? One answer is that 
many scientists do not believe they would be 
sued, even if they infringe. Their stance is con-
sistent with the rational toleration of researcher 
infringement often reported by industry patent 
holders19.
One  respondent  declared  in  a  follow-up 
interview, “If I do my research and don’t make 
money, even if I broke the law, nothing would 
happen to me. I am just doing research for 
the  public.”  Like  many  others,  this  respon-
dent contrasts the interest of scientists from 
those of the university: “What I want is to do 
my research; what they [firms and universi-
ties] want is money. They fought it out and 
gave me an agreement, and I signed it. That is 
how it works.” This seemingly cynical view of 
the objectives of university administrators in   
university-industry negotiations, and the con-
trast with the objectives of researchers, is con-
firmed in the survey of land-grant university 
administrators responsible for research pro-
grams and university-industry relationships 
in the area of agricultural biology by Glenna 
et al.20. They report that administrators rank 
provision of research funds first in the list of 
advantages of university-industry relationships, 
although they acknowledge that their scientists 
have a very different ranking of priorities for 
selection  of  research  problems,  headed  by 
research enjoyment and curiosity.
Before we asked scientists about their views 
of the overall effects of IP protection of research 
tools, we explored a narrower question regard-
ing the possible effects of IP rights on the supply 
of tools. We asked respondents to evaluate, on 
the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (dis-
agree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly), the fol-
lowing statement:
Statement  I.  Intellectual  property  rights 
on  research  tools  provide  incentives  to 
varieties. Gene and protein sequences feature 
most frequently in invention disclosures, fol-
lowed by seeds, germplasm and plant varieties.
Sixty-three respondents sent research tools/
materials to academia, with an overall average 
of 17 each over the five years. Sixty-two received 
tools from other academics, with an average of 
9.5 per respondent. Tools sent to industry aver-
aged 1.2 per respondent, with 23 respondents 
sending at least one, and tools received averaged 
1.6 per respondent, with 31 recipients. Thus, 
the sample, though of modest size, represents a 
wealth of experience, on both sides, of exchang-
ing research tools with their peers in academia 
and industry, forging links to industry and deal-
ing with the patenting process.
For research materials exchanged between 
academic institutions, it has become standard 
policy in universities to mandate use of MTAs. 
However, many researchers willingly ignore 
such requirements. Formal agreements cover 
only  21%  of  cases  where  respondents  pro-
vided tools to other academics over the previ-
ous five years. Indeed, only one-third of those 
who provided tools to academic peers use any 
MTAs at all; just two report using licenses. Even 
the 22 respondents who sent tools to industry 
(in a total of 83 instances) often did so with-
out formal agreements; half never used any in 
the sample period. Licenses cover 16 cases and 
MTAs only 12.
For tools received from other academics, the 
average reported share of formal agreements 
in total exchanges is higher, at 48%. Almost all 
formal agreements are MTAs, with only eight 
license agreements. The reason for the dif-
ference between respondents’ MTA shares as 
recipients and providers (48% versus 21%) is 
not clear. The numbers of MTAs involved are 
more balanced (180 versus 254). It is possible 
that, for informal transfers, the more active role 
of provider is easier to recall.
Of the 31 recipients of tools from industry 
(in a total of 83 cases), 25 report formal agree-
ments,  and  most  transactions  were  formal. 
There were 85 MTAs but only 4 licenses. Only 
one license involved monetary payments.
Sample characteristics including tool 
exchange activities
The scientists in our sample are well qualified 
to report on the relevant issues; many have 
patented  inventions  and  most  are  actively 
involved  in  exchanges  with  colleagues  in 
academia and industry, both providing and 
receiving  research  tools  (defined  here  to 
include such research inputs as vectors, mark-
ers, cell lines and animal models, antibodies, 
drugs, transgenic seeds and plants, germplasm, 
genes and proteins, and databases, but exclud-
ing commercial kits and products from ven-
dors). Their responses thus reflect not only 
their own practices but also those of many 
more colleagues who are their counterparts 
in these exchanges.
In  the  previous  five  years  (the  relevant 
interval for all questions), our respondents 
launched, on average, seven research projects. 
Two were directed toward commercial applica-
tions, consistent with the 27% average share 
of funding from industry, including commod-
ity producer associations. Fifty-six percent 
undertook at least one project directed toward 
commercial application, and 45% report some 
funding from industry, a figure identical to 
that reported for a broader group of land-
grant  agricultural  scientists  by  Goldberger 
et al.16. (All percentages refer to fractions of 
respondents.) By comparison, the studies of 
biomedical scientists reviewed by Beckelman 
et al.17  report  that  23–28%  received  some 
industry funding.
Forty percent have disclosed inventions to 
their universities in the most recent five years, 
and one-third of these (13%) had inventions 
that can be categorized as research tools. Thirty-
four percent have obtained or applied for pat-
ents over the previous five years, and 9% had 
patented research tools; in comparison, 56% of 
US academic scientists in Hansen et al.18 had 
submitted a patent application in the previous 
five years. On average, 0.6 patents per researcher 
have been applied for or granted, greater than 
the 0.45 reported for land-grant agricultural 
scientists in general16. Patentees have the same 
average 27% share of industry funding as non-
patentees.
Active involvement in exchanges of research 
tools  with  either  other  academic  research-
ers and/or industrial scientists is the norm; 
66 report 1,224 cases of provision of research 
tools to others, and 69 report a total of 770 
cases of receiving tools, over five years. The 
types of research tools that are most frequently 
exchanged between researchers are quite dis-
tinct  from  those  that  researchers  choose  to 
patent. Vectors, plasmids and gene clones are 
the  most  commonly  exchanged  unpatented 
tools, followed by seeds, germplasm and plant   
For research materials 
exchanged between academic 
institutions, it has become 
standard policy in universities to 
mandate use of MtAs. However, 
many researchers willingly 
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than commercial kits, not considered here); 
only one transaction (for a tool from a private 
firm) involved a financial payment. Nor do 
researchers find the MTA transaction process 
particularly difficult; they rated the difficulty 
of the MTA transaction process for accessing 
tools from their academic peers as averaging 
between 2.5 and 3.0 on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). 
Obtaining tools from industry using MTAs was 
moderately more difficult, with a mean of 3.6. 
Note, however, that researchers often bear only 
a fraction of the costs of MTA negotiations;   
follow-up  interviews  reveal  that  university 
administrators often handle MTA negotiations, 
after the initial inter-scientist contacts.” 
The scientists distinguish their cost of nego-
tiation from the delay imposed by the entire 
MTA process, and identify the latter as the 
dominant transaction cost. A typical transfer 
from an academic provider, covered by MTA, 
takes four months, compared to six months if 
the transfer is from industry.
It is perhaps understandable that, as provid-
ers, researchers report shorter average lags of 
2.5 to 2.8 months for MTAs they have sent to 
academia and industry because they might not 
always perceive the lag in handling the MTA at 
the receiving end. Licensing to industry has a 
longer average lag, 9.8 months, skewed by a few 
cases with very long lags. Our results show lon-
ger delays due to MTAs than found by Walsh, 
Cho & Cohen2. One reason might be trunca-
tion bias induced by their shorter two-year win-
dow. When scientists are asked to report lags in 
their most recent completed transaction in a 
two-year period, it is likely that cases with long 
lags will be underrepresented in the data, some 
being misinterpreted as instances of refusal to 
send requested tools.
Difficulties in obtaining needed tools in turn 
cause delays in research projects. Thirty-four 
respondents (42%) report a total of 97 such 
delays, ending when the tool arrived. Durations 
range from 1 month to 42 months, with a mean 
of 8.7 months. Eight report delays related to 
access to information about genes or protein 
sequences, and 31 report delays related to access 
to  tangible  materials  such  as  vectors,  seeds,   
Less than one-third of respondents disagree 
with the statement that for tools sourced from 
academia or industry, “Getting access to propri-
etary research tools often involves contractual 
restrictions on publication that cause significant 
constraints on academic freedom.”
Broadly similar results are reported (without 
comment) in AAAS-supported surveys, focused 
on exchanges of patented technology.18,23–25. 
Less than one-third of respondents in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Germany (and 
38% in Japan) agree, on a five-point Likert scale, 
with the statement: “Technologies owned by oth-
ers are easily exchanged through licensing and 
material transfer agreements.” More than 40% 
in all countries but the United Kingdom agree 
that “Obtaining access to technologies owned by 
others often involves contractual restrictions on 
publications that cause significant constraint[s] 
on academic freedom.”
Of course, MTAs are not the only source of 
access problems for academics seeking research 
tools. Long before the proliferation of IP protec-
tion, scientists were often secretive and uncoop-
erative in their interactions with competitors26. 
Indeed,  scientific  competition  inhibits  tool 
access for many of our respondents. We asked 
them to evaluate the likelihood that their rival 
laboratories, competing with them in the same 
field, would give them research tools or materi-
als if asked to do so. They anticipate moderate 
degrees of difficulty in getting tools from rivals, 
with a mean evaluation of 3.2 on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 
5 (very likely).
However,  scientific  competition  cannot 
explain the increase in access problems expe-
rienced by our respondents. More than 50% 
of our sample agrees that, for tools from either 
academia or industry, “for academic research-
ers, getting access to others’ proprietary research 
tools has become more difficult over the past five 
years.” However, only 6% believe that scientific 
competition has increased over this time. On 
the other hand, 45% agree that the use of MTAs 
in obtaining research tools from academia has 
increased.
Monetary  cost  is  not  an  issue,  even  for 
research tools sourced from industry (other 
invent more tools and/or conduct related 
research, and advance the research in your 
area. The mean evaluation is negative, at 2.7 
(P = 0.0003). Respondents are not strongly 
impressed by the supply-side effects of IP 
rights on tools.
Having just been reminded of possible posi-
tive effects of IP rights, the researchers never-
theless believe that IP protection hinders their 
research. We asked them to evaluate, on the 
5-point Likert scale, as above, the following 
statements:
Statement IIA. Overall, the intellectual prop-
erty protection of research tools is having 
a positive impact on research in your area. 
Respondents on average disagree significantly 
with this statement (mean evaluation 2.3, P = 
0.0001).
Statement IIB. Overall, the intellectual prop-
erty protection of research tools is having a 
negative impact on research in your area. A 
majority agrees with Statement IIB (mean eval-
uation 3.7, P = 0.0001). Note that Statement 
IIB is a negative restatement of Statement IIA, 
and the responses are symmetrical, betraying 
no bias related to the difference in the form of 
the question.
How can scientists so unconcerned with 
infringement see IP rights as an impedi-
ment to research? The answer is that they 
associate problems of IP rights with prob-
lems  with  MTAs.  Proliferation  of  patent 
protection is a key driver of the increase in 
university enforcement of the use of MTAs 
for exchanges of research materials. In par-
ticular, after the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, “When 
professors sent cell lines or reagents to other 
scientists, they now had to accompany them 
with a materials transfer agreement con-
taining complex restrictions against further 
distribution”21.
Walsh et al.9 find that when the recipient 
of a request for a research material asked for 
an MTA, there was less friction in the transfer 
process, perhaps because the response indi-
cates a willingness to comply with the request. 
Nevertheless, we find that researchers associate 
MTAs with the types of transaction costs dis-
cussed by Eisenberg22.
The costs of formal agreements
Almost  one-half  of  respondents  disagree 
with  the  following  statement:  “Research 
tools are easily exchanged through licensing/
material transfer agreements.” (Forty-eight 
percent  and  47%  “disagree”  or  “disagree 
strongly” for tools from academia and from 
industry, respectively, whereas only 25% and 
17% agree or agree strongly, respectively.)








Intercept   2.60 ± 0.14a   3.46 ± 0.13a    2.59 ± 0.14a
number of delays   –0.2 ± 0.04a   0.17 ± 0.04a –0.05 ± 0.06
number of other negative effects  0.04 ± 0.07  0.02 ± 0.08   0.01 ± 0.02
Dummy variable for being tool patentee –0.04 ± 0.42 –0.34 ± 0.44   0.46 ± 0.58
Coefficient estimates ± s.e.m. 
aP < 0.01. (Other negative effects include substitution of equivalent or less effective tools, prevention of initiation of a line 
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reports (without comment) that more than 
half of respondents believe that IP rights 
impair the free and open exchange of mate-
rials and/or research results18,23–25.
As noted above, several recent studies focus 
exclusively on patented technologies. Murray 
and Stern indicate that at least half of the cita-
tions to papers reporting research that results in 
a patent are made before the patent issues, and 
around half are made before the patent appli-
cation is published27. Because infringement is 
impossible before a patent issues, it is not sur-
prising that much use of research tools is not 
directly restricted by a prior patent. Any meth-
ods revealed in publications or presentations 
can be copied without fear of infringement, 
until a patent issues. In this environment, it is 
not surprising that university administrators, 
focused on protecting prospective IP rights, 
want their scientists to protect their materials 
with MTAs as soon as they can.
More generally, the patent-MTA dichotomy, 
discussed in recent papers, is false. The recent 
survey of US scientists reports that more scien-
tists (36%) acquired their last patented technol-
ogy through the use of a MTA than through a 
nonexclusive or exclusive license (12% and 8%, 
respectively)18.
Our findings, consistent with previous sur-
veys, support Eisenberg’s conjecture that “pat-
ents in and of themselves might only rarely pose 
an obstacle to the research plans of academic 
scientists”19. Scientists by and large pay no 
attention to the patent status of their research 
tools because they rightly view themselves as 
judgment-proof due to their lack of personal 
resources. Patenting of research tools compli-
cates tool exchanges because it induces institu-
tional administrators, whose financial priorities 
scientists do not generally share, to encourage 
or mandate the use of MTAs in exchanges of 
such tools. Our biologists’ accounts of recent 
instances  of  delayed  or  blocked  access  to 
research tools recognize this negative net effect 
of the proliferation of university IP protection 
after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
An academic research exemption will not 
discourage universities from insisting on nego-
tiating MTAs to protect their financial interests 
in prospective commercialization of research 
discoveries. But agreements between universi-
ties and other nonprofit institutions to discour-
age patenting of research tools used mainly by 
scientists, or to foster sharing of proprietary 
technology, could improve access to needed 
research tools and increase research productiv-
ity. The PIPRA and BiOS initiatives are exam-
ples designed to facilitate such sharing in the 
new, IP-dominated research environment.
Note: Supplementary information is available on the 
Nature Biotechnology website. 
The influence of research delays
Personal  experience  with  research  tool 
exchanges affects researchers’ attitudes toward 
IP rights. In particular, researchers who report at 
least one research delay associated with IP pro-
tection are significantly more negative regard-
ing the effects of IP rights in their responses to 
Statements IIA and IIB.
The number of delays experienced also influ-
ences attitudes. Simple Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regressions show that the more delays 
respondents have experienced, the more they 
tend to report negative evaluations of the effects 
of IP protection in responses to Statements IIA 
and IIB. On the other hand, the number of 
delays does not significantly affect responses 
to Statement I; delays do not sour researchers’ 
views on this issue (Table 1).
Conclusions
The agricultural biologists we surveyed report 
that the IP protection of research tools is, on 
balance,  having  a  negative  impact  on  their 
research areas. These scientists, actively involved 
on both sides of exchanges of research materi-
als, associate the spread of IP protection with 
the proliferation of MTAs, which in turn has 
increased the frequency of cases of delayed or 
blocked access to needed research tools.
These  responses  are  grounded  in  experi-
ence; the IP rights–related research delays the 
biologists report are strongly and negatively 
correlated with their attitudes to IP protection. 
Although they believe problems of timely access 
to be increasing, few perceive any evidence of 
increased competitive withholding of coopera-
tion by their peers.
At first glance, our sample’s views regard-
ing  IP  protection  might  appear  to  be  at 
odds with previous surveys attributing the 
research tool access problem to scientists’ 
reluctance  to  share  materials  they  con-
trol,  motivated  by  increasing  competitive 
pressures,  cost  of  sharing  or  commercial 
concerns2,8. However, none of those surveys 
asked scientists for their own assessment of 
the effects of IP protection on research in 
their fields. Our general conclusions are con-
sistent with the fact that each of the AAAS’ 
Project on Science and Intellectual Property 
in the Public Interest four-country studies 
germplasm, cell lines and microbial strains. The 
consequences of these delays were ranked at a 
moderate average value of three on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not bad at all) to 5 
(extremely bad).
In addition, 22 respondents (27%) report 
a total of 53 instances in which difficulties in 
obtaining research tools affected their research 
projects in ways other than causing delays. In 14 
such cases, an equivalent accessible tool was sub-
stituted, but in 20 others, the researchers used 
less effective tools; in 14, access problems pre-
vented initiation of a line of research. Another 
5 research projects were reportedly abandoned. 
Our follow-up interviews indicate that cases of 
blocked research have not been catastrophic for 
the researchers or for their institution, though 
they affected the direction of some respondents’ 
research programs.
Supplementary Interviews online report on 
11 follow-up interviews of some of the scien-
tists who encountered one or more problems 
of access to needed tools in the past five years. 
In five cases, researchers identified university-
imposed MTA requirements (with no corporate 
involvement) as the problem, and four more 
involved conflicts between corporate and uni-
versity objectives for protecting their respective 
financial interests. In two more, corporate data 
confidentiality goals conflicted with freedom 
to publish. There were two cases of embargoes 
of material transfers by foreign governments 
to protect the value of their countries’ intellec-
tual property. In at least 10 of the 17 cases, it 
appears that there would have been no problem 
of access for research to given innovations, had 
universities and governments not been trying 
to protect institutional financial interests in IP 
claims on research tools. Of the 17 cases inves-
tigated in detail, only one involved competitive 
withholding by an academic peer.
The influence of patent ownership
One might well expect those scientists who are 
personally involved in patenting to hold more 
positive opinions regarding IP protection. Our 
data do show that, for patentees, acquisition 
of tools from industry is significantly less dif-
ficult than for nonpatentees (mean 2.7 versus 
3.8, t value = 2.6, P = 0.02). Those with patents 
likewise find it significantly less difficult to pro-
vide tools to their academic colleagues (mean 
2.0 versus 2.9, P = 0.003). Patentee providers 
report a significantly higher share of formal 
agreements (34% versus 12%, P = 0.016).
Nevertheless, patentees do not significantly 
differ from the rest of the sample in their evalu-
ations of Statements IIA and IIB. Furthermore, 
we found no evidence that the share of financial 
support from industry significantly influences 
attitudes on IP protection.
the agricultural biologists we 
surveyed report that the Ip 
protection of research tools is, 
on balance, having a negative 
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